Time-shift attack in practical quantum cryptosystems by Qi, Bing et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
05
12
08
0v
3 
 1
1 
M
ay
 2
00
6 TIME-SHIFT ATTACK IN PRACTICAL QUANTUM CRYPTOSYSTEMS
BING QI
CHI-HANG FRED FUNG
HOI-KWONG LO
XIONGFENG MA
Center for Quantum Information and Quantum Control (CQIQC),
Dept. of Physics and Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G4, Canada
Recently, a new type of attack, which exploits the efficiency mismatch of two single pho-
ton detectors (SPD) in a quantum key distribution (QKD) system, has been proposed. In
this paper, we propose another “time-shift” attack that exploits the same imperfection.
In our attack, Eve shifts the arrival time of either the signal pulse or the synchroniza-
tion pulse or both between Alice and Bob. In particular, in a QKD system where Bob
employs time-multiplexing technique to detect both bit “0” and bit “1” with the same
SPD, Eve, in some circumstances, could acquire full information on the final key without
introducing any error. In addition, we prove that if Alice and Bob are unaware of our
attack, the final key they share is insecure. We emphasize that our attack is simple and
feasible with current technology. Finally, we discuss some counter measures against our
and earlier attacks.
1 Introduction
One of the most important practical application of quantum information is quantum key
distribution (QKD), whose unconditional security is based on the fundamental law of quan-
tum mechanics [1–6]. In principle, any eavesdropping attempt by a third party (Eve) will
unavoidably introduce disturbance. So, it’s possible for the legitimate users (Alice and Bob)
to upper bound the amount of information acquired by an eavesdropper from the measured
quantum bit error rate (QBER). Alice and Bob can then distill a final secure key by per-
forming error correction and privacy amplification. Unfortunately, a practical QKD system
has imperfections and Eve may try to exploit these imperfections and launch specific attacks.
One example is the photon number splitting (PNS) attack [7–10], where Eve takes advantage
of the nonzero multi-photon emission probability of Alice’s laser source and the lossy nature
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of a quantum channel. Security proofs for practical QKD systems exist [11, 12]. Recently,
decoy state QKD [13–20] has also been proposed to substantially increase the distance and
key generation rate of a practical QKD system when weak coherent-state sources are used.
Another critical device, which limits the performance of a long distance QKD system, is
the single photon detector (SPD). Currently, many practical QKD systems use optical com-
munication fibers as their quantum channels and work at the Telecom wavelengths of around
either 1550nm or 1310nm. Single photon detection at these wavelengths is often performed by
(thermoelectric) cooled InGaAs avalanche photo diodes (APDs) [21]. To minimize the dark
count rate, this type of detector usually works in gated mode: it is activated by a suitable
electrical gate signal for a narrow window (a few ns) only when a signal pulse (a few hundreds
of ps) is expected to arrive. Outside of this time window, a detector has no response to
the input photons. Obviously, in this design, the synchronization between Alice’s source and
Bob’s detectors is critical.
Recently, an eavesdropping attack that exploits the efficiency mismatch of two single
photon detectors in a practical QKD system has been proposed in [22]. In this attack, Eve
intercepts and performs a complete von Neumann measurement on each quantum state sent
out by Alice. She then generates a new time-shifted signal based on her measurement result.
In the extreme case where there is complete detector efficiency mismatch (that is to say, there
is a time window where the detector for the bit “0” is active while the detector for the bit
“1” is completely inactive, and vice versa), Eve can acquire full information on the final key
without introducing any error.
In this paper, we propose a simple attack that exploits the same imperfection. More
specifically, in our attack, Eve does not measure the quantum state sent by Alice. Instead,
Eve simply time-shifts each of Alice’s signal forward or backward as she wishes. It turns out
that the security of some practical QKD systems, particularly those with time-multiplexed
SPDs, could be totally compromised by this simple attack. We emphasize that our attack
can be implemented with current technology.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we summarize the basic results in [22]
and then propose our new eavesdropping strategy. This is followed by a comparison of these
two attacks. In Section 3, we discuss the security loophole of QKD systems with a time-
multiplexed SPD. Finally, in Section 4, we discuss some counter measures against our and
earlier attacks.
2 Eavesdropping strategies exploiting detector efficiency mismatch
In a BB84 QKD system [1], typically, Bob uses two separate SPDs, which are labeled as
SPD0 and SPD1, to detect bit “0” and bit “1” respectively. As we discussed in Section 1,
to minimize the dark count rate, each of these two SPDs is only activated for a narrow time
window when the signal is expected. Owing to the different responses of the two APDs and
other imperfections in electronics, the time-dependent efficiencies of these two SPDs are not
identical. Because the width of SPD’s open window (a few ns) is often substantially larger,
or at least not shorter than the laser pulse duration (a few hundreds ps), Alice and Bob can
synchronize the laser pulse with the center of SPD’s open window. This ensures that the
small detector efficiency mismatch will not affect the normal operation of the QKD system.
Ref. [22] considers the time-dependent detector efficiency of the two detectors. Fig.1 shows
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Fig. 1. The time-dependence efficiencies of SPDs. The dark (light) curve corresponds to the
efficiency of SPD0 (SPD1). At time t0, SPD0 is more sensitive to the incoming photon than
SPD1.
a diagram of the time-dependent efficiency of the two SPDs: at time t0, the efficiency of SPD0,
η0(t0), is much higher than that of SPD1, η1(t0), while at time t1, η0(t1)≪ η1(t1). Taking a
symmetrical assumption [22], we can define
r =
η1(t0)
η0(t0)
=
η0(t1)
η1(t1)
(1)
where r ∈ [0, 1]. In the extreme case favorable to Eve, r = 0, which means only SPD0 is
active in time t0, and only SPD1 is active at time t1.
The intercept-resend attack described in [22] goes as follows:
(1) Eve intercepts quantum states from Alice and measures each of them in a randomly
chosen basis;
(2) According to her measurement result, Eve prepares a new quantum state (faked state
[23]) in a different basis with a different bit value. For example, if she measures in Z
basis and gets bit “0” (labeled as Z0), then she prepares bit “1” in X basis (X1);
(3) According to her measurement result, Eve sends out her faked state at different time so
that it arrives at Bob’s SPD at either time t0 (corresponding to her measurement result
“0”) or t1 (corresponding to her measurement result “1”).
Assuming the intrinsic QBER in Alice and Bob’s system is zero, the QBER caused by this
attack can be derived as [22]:
QBER =
2η0(t1) + 2η1(t0)
η0(t0) + 3η0(t1) + 3η1(t0) + η1(t1)
(2)
In one extreme case when r = 0 (which corresponds to η0(t1) = η1(t0) = 0), QBER=0. So
Eve can acquire full information on the sifted key without introducing any errors. In the other
extreme case, when r = 1 (the two SPDs are perfectly matched), Eve causes QBER=1/2. So,
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Eve is only doing a random guess. This is worse than the standard intercept-resend attack
(which causes QBER =1/4, and requires exactly the same equipment capabilities from Eve).
The attack [22] becomes more efficient than the standard intercept-resend attack for r < 0.2.
In the intermediate case when 0 < r < 0.2, the QBER calculated from (2) could be lower
than the proven lower bound of standard BB84 system. In other words, a direct application
of standard security proofs, e.g. GLLP [12], without taking into account of detector efficiency
mismatch, is invalid.
Note that, to implement the attack in [22], Eve will need a complicated detection (similar
to Bob’s system) and resend (similar to Alice’s system) system. If we assume that Eve builds
her “practical” eavesdropping device based on today’s technology, she will also experience the
problem of low detection efficiency and will introduce additional errors (even in the case of
r = 0) due to the imperfections in her setup.
Here we propose a simple and practical attack that exploits the same imperfection. Fig.2
shows the schematic diagram of the experimental system that implements our attack. Instead
of measuring Alice’s quantum state, Eve just randomly shifts the time of Alice’s quantum
state to make sure that it arrives at Bob’s detector at either time t0 or at time t1. If Eve
chooses time t0 ( t1 ), whenever Bob detects a signal, with the probability of 1/(r + 1), the
bit value will be “0” ( “1” ). [Here, we assume equal prior probability for the bit “0” and “1”
emitted by Alice.] In the extreme case when r = 0, this probability is equal to one. Because
the probability that Eve guesses Bob’s bit value wrong is r/(r+1), So Eve’s knowledge about
the final key is given by:
I(B : E) = 1− h(r/(r + 1)), (3)
where h(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1− x) is the binary Shannon entropy function. Note
that in this attack, Eve does not measure Alice’s state. Therefore, Eve never introduces any
errors.
We now show that whenever I(B : E) > 0, the final key shared between Alice and Bob is
insecure if they are not aware of Eve’s attack. In order to show this, we compute an upper
bound on the key generation rate under Eve’s attack. One upper bound is the conditional
mutual information [24] given by
I(A : B|E) = h(r/(r + 1)). (4)
Thus, if Alice and Bob are not aware of our attack, then they would generate keys at a rate
equal to 1 since there are no bit errorsa. Therefore, whenever h(r/(r + 1)) < 1, or in other
words, when Alice and Bob generate keys at a rate higher than the upper bound, the final key
shared between them is insecure. To quantify this key rate upper bound, we may substitute
in an experimental value of r = 2 observed in our experiment. This gives us an upper bound
of I(A : B|E) = h(2/3) = 0.9183. Thus, our attack does cause a moderate decrease in the
key rate upper bound in this case.
Comparing with the attack in [22], our attack is simpler and can be easily realized with
today’s technology: Eve can use high speed optical switches to re-route Alice’s signal through
either a long optical path or a short optical path to achieve the desired time shift. Another
aIn reality, due to the finiteness of the number of signals, Alice and Bob may choose the key generation rate
to be 1− h(ǫ), where ǫ is some security parameter.
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Fig. 2. A schematic diagram of Eve’s attack. HOS: high-speed optical switch.
Fig. 3. A scheme for detecting both bit “0” and bit “1” with the same SPD: W–wave plate,
PBS–polarization beam splitter.
advantage of our attack is that Eve never introduces any errors. So, it is hard for Alice and
Bob to detect Eve’s presence.
One drawback of our attack (from the point of view of Eve) is that Eve can’t get the full
information (unless r = 0) on the sifted key. So, it might still be possible for Alice and Bob
to work out a secure key, provided that they can correctly upper bound Eve’s information.
In both the attack proposed in [22] and the one proposed here, Bob’s detection efficiency
is lower than normal. In the previous case, Eve can compensate this decrease by using a
stronger faked state, or by using a low-loss quantum channel, or by placing her intercept unit
near Alice and resend unit near Bob to bypass the quantum channel [22], whereas in our
attack, Eve has to use a low-loss channel. Another alternative to using a low-loss channel is
for Eve to mask herself by introducing additional loss during the calibration phase. This can
be done with current technology.
In next section, we will show that for some QKD design, where Bob uses the same SPD
to detect both bit “0” and bit “1”, Eve could time-shift both the synchronization signal and
quantum signal to acquire full information without introducing any errors. In other words,
our attack is fatal there.
3 Security loophole of QKD system with a time-multiplexed SPD
In a standard design of BB84 QKD system, Alice sends out her quantum bit in a randomly
chosen basis, while Bob also randomly chooses his measurement basis and uses two separate
SPDs to detect bit “0” or bit “1”. In a modified system design [25, 26], Bob detects both bit
“0” and bit “1” with the same SPD, by employing time-multiplexing technique.
In this design, the expected arrival time t0 of bit “0” (to SPD) is different from the
expected arrival time t1 of bit “1”, with the time difference
∆t = t1 − t0 (5)
determined by the optical length difference n(L1 − L0), as shown in Fig. 3. Here, n is the
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Fig. 4. Synchronization between Alice’s pulse and Bob’s SPDs: S1-classical Sync pulses, S2-SPD’s
gating signals, S3-signal pulses without Eve, S4-Eve shifts the signal pulses by +∆t.
effective refractive index of the fibers and we assume t1 > t0. So, it’s possible for Bob to
distinguish bit “0” and bit “1” from the detection time information.
Besides the advantage of saving one SPD (which is a most expensive component in a
QKD system), this specific design also helps to minimize the asymmetry between the detection
efficiency of bit “0” and bit “1”. Unfortunately, as we will demonstrate below, this design may
also open a loophole that will allow Eve to launch the “time-shift” attack that we discussed
in Section 2.
Note that if Bob’s SPD works in a gated mode (as the case for most Telecommunication
wavelength QKD), it has to be activated twice for each incoming pulse (at time t0 and t1).
Since there is no overlap between these two open time windows, this is equivalent to the case
r = 0 in Section 2. Therefore, Eve could acquire full information on the sifted key without
introducing any error. Before we go into the details of this attack, we will first discuss the
synchronization of Alice’s laser pulse with Bob’s detection window in a practical QKD system.
This synchronization issue is crucial for our discussion.
A widely used synchronization method in a practical QKD system is by multiplexing a
strong synchronizing laser pulse with the weak signal pulse by employing wavelength division
multiplexing (WDM) technique [27,28]. In [28], Alice multiplexes each weak signal pulse (1.55
µm) with a strong timing pulse (1.3µm) and sends them to Bob through the same optical
fiber. On the receiver’s side, Bob first separates the timing pulse from the signal pulse with a
WDM component, and then detects the timing pulse with an APD, which in turn produces
two electrical gating signals to control the two SPDs (or in the case of time-multiplexed SPD,
these two electrical gating signals activate the SPD twice for each signal pulse). The time
relations of various signals are depicted in Fig. 4.
Eve’s eavesdropping strategy is quite similar to the one we proposed in Section 2: Eve
doesn’t measure Alice’s quantum state. Instead, she flips the bit value first (for phase encoding
BB84 protocol, this can easily be done by using a phase modulator to introduce an additional
pi phase shift between the signal and reference pulses sent by Alice) and then randomly time-
shifts the pulse (relative to the strong sync pulse) by an amount of either −∆t or +∆t. Fig. 4
(S4) shows the situation when Eve does the +∆t shift. Obviously, in this case, Bob can only
detect bit “1” or nothing; the bit “0” is blinded. Similarly, when Eve does the “−∆t” shift,
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Table 1. Alice sends out Z0 and Bob measures in Z basis.
Quantum state Eve flips the Eve does random time shift Bob’s measurement results
from Alice bit value in Z basis
Time shift Possibility Bit value Possibility
Z0 Z1
−∆t 1
2
0 1
2
1 0
+∆t 1
2
0 0
1 0
Bob can only detect bit “0” or nothing. So, whenever Bob has a detection event, Eve has full
information about his bit value.
Table 1 summarizes all possible events when Alice sends out Z0 and Bob measures in Z
basis. The other three cases can be easily worked out by symmetry. Again, as we explained
in Section 2, Eve’s attack does not introduce any error.
Note that if the time interval ∆t between the two open windows of Bob’ SPD is exactly
equal to half of the laser pulse period ∆T , as the case in [26], this attack cannot be applied [29].
The reason is the following: Owing to Eve’s shifting of the pulse, the arriving time of the
“blinded” bit will overlap with one of the SPD’s two open windows for the successive signal.
For example, suppose Eve does “+∆t” shift to the kth laser pulse, then with 50% chance, the
incoming photon will be detected at the time corresponding to bit “0” for the (k+1)th pulse.
It’s easy to see that QBER in this case is 25%.
Note that QKD systems with a long SPD gating period (larger than 3∆t) may be immune
to this kind of attack. In this case, Bob may monitor counts fall outside the predetermined
“0” and “1”windows. For example, in [30], the SPD is gated with ∼ 100ns pulse, while the
time interval ∆t between bit “0” and bit “1” is a 6.2ns. In this case, the SPD is only activated
once for each incoming signal, and Bob can distinguish bit “0” from bit “1” by measuring the
time difference between the sync pulse and the detected photon.
4 Discussion
The recently proposed eavesdropping strategy exploits the detector efficiency mismatch of
SPDs [22]. In this paper, we propose a simple time-shifting attack that exploits the same
imperfection. We emphasize that our attack is simple and feasible with current technology.
In particular, we demonstrate a QKD system, where Bob employs time-multiplexing technique
to detect both bit “0” and bit “1” with the same SPD, is especially vulnerable to this kind
of attack.
People may ask that even there is a mismatch between the efficiencies of two SPDs, how
Eve can know that. We remark that in quantum cryptography, if we cannot prove that Eve
is incapable of getting this information, then we have to assume that this information is
available to Eve. In fact, in this specific case, Eve, in principle, does have a way to acquire
this information during the normal quantum key distribution process: she can randomly block
a small fraction of the pulses from Alice and resend faked pulses to Bob (she only changes
a small fraction, so the QBER does not change significantly). Each faked pulse is randomly
prepared in one of the four states as in the BB84 protocol, and its delay time can be tuned by
Eve. After the classical communication stage, Eve knows Bob’s basis choice for each detected
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faked pulse. In the case when they (Eve and Bob) use the same basis, Eve knows for sure
which SPD clicks. Let us assume that the properties of the two SPDs stay constant over a long
period of time during an experiment. In this case, given a long enough time, Eve can simply
repeat her attacks and thus gather enough statistical data to determine the efficiencies of both
SPDs at various delay times. With this information, she can launch the time-shift attack we
discussed in this paper. Another scenario where Eve can obtain the efficiency information is
that Eve is actually the producer of the QKD system Alice and Bob use. Thus, in principle,
Eve knows the efficiency mismatch between the two SPDs.
To counter Eve’s attack, Alice and Bob could develop various counter measures, such
as those discussed in [22]. Other counter measures include: strict checks for detection rate
and loss in the quantum channel; applying phase shift setting to Bob’s phase modulator for
a narrower time period than [−∆t, +∆t] relative to the normal pulse position; randomly
shifting the gating window; and using a non-gating SPD.
We note that a recently proposed single SPD QKD system is also immune to this attack
[31]. In a phase encoding BB84 version of this design, instead of randomly selecting from
a set of two values, Bob’s phase modulation is randomly selected from a set of four values,
which is identical to the set for Alice’s phase modulation. In this case, Bob not only randomly
chooses his measuring basis for each incoming pulse, he also randomly determines which SPD
(or which time window in the case of time-multiplexed SPD) is used for detecting bit “0” or
bit “1”. Bob broadcasts his basis choice, but keeps his choice of detector (for the bit “0” or
“1”) secret. In such a set-up, even if Eve has the information about which detector clicks, Eve
still cannot work out Bob’s bit value because she does not know which detector corresponds
to bit “0”. On another hand, the set-up in [31] may open up an unrelated security loophole.
More concretely, Eve may try to read out Bob’s detector assignments by employing a strong
external laser pulse, as described in [32].
We conclude with some general comments on the security of QKD. First, a security proof
is only as good as its underlying assumptions. Once a security loophole has been discovered,
it is often not too difficult to develop counter-measures that will plug the loophole and regain
proofs of unconditional security of QKD. One example is the PNS attack that we mentioned
in Section 1. However, the hard part is how to find out those security loopholes in the first
place. A QKD system is a complicated system with many intrinsic imperfections. It is, thus,
very important to conduct extensive research in those imperfections carefully to see if they are
innocent or fatal for security. We need more quantum hackers in the field. The investigation
of loopholes and counter-measures in practical QKD systems plays a complementary role to
security proofs.
Second, implementing a countermeasure for some security loophole may open up new
loopholes (such as the one mentioned above). Also, regarding countermeasures, in our opinion,
there is a big difference between what Bob could do in principle and what Bob actually does
in practice.
Third, it is important to construct a list of potential countermeasures, and to compare
and contrast them. This task is specified in the ARDA’s quantum cryptography roadmap [33]
as one of the major milestones. Such a study will help us to better understand the pros and
cons of the various countermeasures and eventually lead to the identification of the best
countermeasure in practice.
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Fourth, given that a practical QKD system will always have imperfections, one might
wonder if QKD systems offer any real advantage over conventional systems. Our answer
is three-fold. First of all, implementation loopholes are a fact of life. Even conventional
security systems such as smart cards suffer implementation loopholes. For instance, Eve may
attempt to read off a private key from a smart card by using various techniques (including
X-ray) to reverse-engineer the circuit embedded in a smart card. Second, QKD can be used
in concatenation with a conventional system to ensure security [34]. By defending in depth,
QKD can only increase security, not reduce it. Third, QKD has an important advantage
of being future-proof: The signals are quantum. Once the transmission is done, there is no
transcript for the transmission. For an eavesdropper to launch a quantum attack, she has
to possess much of the quantum technology during the quantum transmission. In contrast,
in a standard Diffie-Hellman public-key key exchange scheme, Eve has a complete transcript
of the transmission and can save such a transcript for decades to wait for unexpected future
advances in hardware and algorithms. Given that public key crypto-systems was itself an
unexpected discovery made only three decades ago, our view is that it will be complacent to
believe that our standard public key crypto-systems will be safe forever. Therefore, it pays
to diversify one’s risk by defending in depth with a QKD system in concatenation with a
conventional cryptosystem.
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